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ABSTRACT 
Manuscript Type: Empirical. 
Research Question/Issue: Do cooperative banks suffer from board deficiencies less 
frequently and severely than joint-stock banks? To answer this question, we analyze banks 
operating in Italy during the period 2006-2012 to examine whether the governing bodies of 
cooperative banks are less effective in carrying out their duties than those of joint-stock 
banks. Deficiencies in the governing body are measured by sanctions imposed by the 
supervisory authority.  
Research Findings/Insights: Findings revealed that the boards of directors of cooperative 
banks were sanctioned more often than board of directors of joint-stock banks. Furthermore, 
board turnover mediates the relationship between the cooperative status and board 
deficiencies. 
Theoretical/Academic Implications: This study provides empirical evidence in support of 
the weakness of corporate governance in cooperative banks. Methodologically, our approach 
is novel in that we adopt a measure of board effectiveness/deficiency based on an 
independent third-party perspective (supervisory authority) that is not biased by the different 
objective function of the two types of banks. 
Practitioner/Policy Implications: The findings have several policy and managerial 
implications. We contribute to the ongoing debate on the proposal for flexible regulation of 
corporate governance for cooperative banks and emphasize that policy-makers and regulators 
should rethink the corporate governance structures of cooperative banks. In particular, the 
study reveals how board turnover should be carefully monitored to reduce board deficiencies 
at the bank level. 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Board Effectiveness, Institutional Setting, Banking 
Industry, Enforcement Actions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The recent financial crisis has emphasized the critical role of good corporate governance in 
banking and revealed how existing regulatory failures could severely impair the stability of 
the financial system (Beatty & Lao, 2014). In both the US and Europe, the boards of several 
key financial institutions were found to have been unable to either effectively monitor risk-
management systems and executive salaries (the United States and United Kingdom) or guard 
against conflicts of interest (Spain and Germany). In response to the crisis, since 2009, the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Financial Stability 
Board (FSB), and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) have revised their 
standards for corporate governance in areas such as risk management, board structures, 
compensation, and the role of supervisors. The EU Commission and the European Banking 
Authority have developed new laws and sub-laws to implement these new standards for the 
European Union (Capital Requirements Regulation –CRR– and Capital Requirements 
Directive –CRD– IV). The most recent initiative is by the BCBS with the publication in 
October 2014 of a consultation paper aiming to revise the document “Principles for 
Enhancing Corporate Governance” (BCBS, 2010). The response of banks to these initiatives 
has been different. Joint-stock banks and their governance were at the center of the financial 
crisis, and they are therefore more willing to comply with new standards to restore the 
confidence of the market, whereas cooperative banks questioned whether the new principles 
were sufficiently flexible to respond to the diversity of their business (lower risks, lower 
volatility and more stable returns) as well as their higher resilience during the crisis 
(European Association of Cooperative Banks –EACB-, 2015).  
In particular, in January 2015, the EACB published notes on the recent BCBS consultation 
paper and argued that cooperative banks performed better during the crisis than did joint-
stock banks because of their specific corporate governance characteristics. However, this 
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argument challenges the traditional view supported by the theoretical literature based on 
agency theory that cooperative banks may structurally suffer more from weak corporate 
governance than do joint-stock banks, causing substantial board ineffectiveness 
(Alexopoulos, Catturani, & Goglio, 2013; Cuevas & Fischer, 2006; Llewellyn, 2005, 2006; 
Shaw, 2006).  
To contribute to the debate outlined above, this study focuses on the board of directors, which 
plays a key role in current regulation, as the top of the internal governance system of the 
banks (EBA, 2011). In particular, the purpose of this work is to investigate whether and to 
what extent the institutional setting affects the effectiveness of the boards of cooperatives 
compared to those of joint-stock banks.  
To investigate this issue empirically, we take into account that cooperative and joint-stock 
banks differ in their objectives, in their ownership structure and in the rights that are granted 
to their owners. As in cooperative firms, members/owners of cooperative banks are also their 
customers. Membership is not transferable, and is redeemable at a nominal value. Moreover, 
cooperative banks are characterized by the one-member one-vote per capita regardless of the 
subscribed capital. Consequently, members cannot accumulate votes by purchasing shares on 
the market. As for the bank objective, profit-maximization is not the sole business objective 
of cooperative banks as in joint stock banks, but they pursue the maximization of member’s 
value by offering products and services along with the distribution of profits (Fontayne, 
2007).  
Given that profitability is not the main objective of cooperative banks, to avoid biased results, 
we deviate from the literature on corporate governance that focuses predominantly on 
financial performance as a proxy of the effectiveness of governance. We argue that this 
comparison should focus on the bank’s internal governance system, a limited but crucial 
component of bank governance that is not affected by bank objectives and/or key bank 
5 
 
stakeholders. As a consequence, we evaluate the board effectiveness of cooperative vs. joint-
stock banks using a supervisory authority as an independent third-party perspective. This 
authority has the power to impose sanctions on the board of directors for misconduct, and we 
use these sanctions as a proxy for board deficiencies. Although the objectives of cooperative 
differ from those of joint-stock banks, the supervisory authority has the same objective when 
supervising both types of banks and their directors: to detect misconduct at the bank level and 
ensure the financial stability of the banking system. Moreover, this proxy of board deficiency 
renders our analyses less likely to be affected by endogeneity as the sanctions are the result of 
regular controls of the supervisory authority, which do not depend on bank behavior. 
Based on a unique dataset of the supervisory sanctions imposed on the boards and directors 
for a large sample of Italian banks over the period 2006-2012, our results show that 
cooperative boards are more deficient than boards of joint-stock banks. In particular, 
regression results show that cooperative boards have on average a higher probability of being 
sanctioned, incurring more violations and, especially for small banks, incurring more severe 
penalties. Notably, we also find that compared with joint-stock banks, cooperative boards are 
more likely to be deficient in credit management.  
These results are in line with agency theory and less supportive of the current debate on the 
strength of cooperative bank boards, but they confirm the specialness of cooperative 
governance mechanisms. Practically, our results suggest that particular attention should be 
paid to board turnover as we find that turnover mediates the relationship between board 
deficiency and cooperative status, such that cooperative board members are at greater risk of 
becoming powerful and entrenched. The results are robust to different dependent variables, 
model specifications and time periods (pre- and post-crisis). 
In this work, we contribute to the literature on corporate governance and the role of 
institutional settings in board functioning. To the best of our knowledge, the empirical 
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evidence on the relationship between bank institutional setting and the effectiveness of 
corporate governance is limited if not absent. Our contribution is twofold. First, we adopt a 
third-party perspective, which allows the construction of new measure(s) of board deficiency. 
Second, we develop our empirical analyses based on methodologies from the corporate fraud 
literature and apply them to bank corporate governance. To the best of our knowledge, both 
contributions are novel in the literature. Italy has one of the largest cooperative banking 
systems, and it is worth noting that Italian banks have recently made progress in improving 
their corporate governance as a result of the implementation of European Directives, specific 
provisions introduced by the Bank of Italy (BoI), and industry codes of conduct. Our results 
may improve our understanding of the major weaknesses of existing board regulations. 
Finally, we believe that our results can have policy implications by making a clear and 
concrete contribution to the ongoing debate on the revision of the principles for enhancing 
corporate governance and partially supporting cooperative banks. 
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we present the theoretical background 
of our study. Then, we review the literature to develop our research hypotheses. Next, we 
present the sample and the methodology used to test the hypotheses. Then, we present and 
discuss the results and the robustness checks. Finally, we discuss the implications of our 
findings and our conclusion. 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Theoretical Approach 
In the agency perspective, the board of directors has a key role in monitoring the managers to 
prevent them from pursuing their own interests over those of the owners (Fama & Jensen, 
1983). In the banking sector, the role of the board is even more critical than in other industry. 
Banking business is complex and therefore nontransparent to a wide audience of stakeholders 
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(shareholders, creditors, debtors, regulators, etc.). Llewellyn (2007) shows that financial 
firms: 
 are characterized by complex and nontransparent management, primarily due to the 
characteristics of financial products (Levine, 2004); 
 are relationship- rather than transaction-based businesses involving long-term contracts. 
This characteristic makes it more difficult for the customers to control relationship 
dynamics and the decision to get out;  
  have a fiduciary responsibility because they manage the wealth of their customers; 
 may affect the convenience of contracts with customers by adopting post-contractual 
opportunistic behavior. 
In addition to traditional agency problems affecting the relationship between managers and 
owners, the banking business suffers from a significant risk of opportunistic behavior at the 
expense of customers such as depositors and borrowers (Morgan, 2002). Thus, board of 
directors have a key role in bank governance as they not only monitor management but also 
provide guidance and advice to managers (de Andres & Vallelado, 2008; Grove, Patelli, 
Victoravich, & Xu, 2011). After the financial crisis, this role was revised by banking 
authorities to stress the importance of board of directors in the sound and prudent 
management of credit institutions. In particular, the European Banking Authority and the 
Basel Committee have recently placed the board of directors at the top of the internal 
governance system of banks. It is now responsible for setting objectives for the bank and the 
level of risk appetite, for bank organization and direction and for the allocation of 
responsibility and authority. It is also responsible for the organization of the internal control 
system (including risk control, compliance and internal audits) (EBA, 2011).   
The literature has analyzed the factors that could increase board effectiveness. According to 
agency theory, the effectiveness of the board in monitoring managers is affected mainly by 
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the number of outside or independent directors involved (Baysinger & Butler, 1985; Fama & 
Jensen, 1983; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Moreover, the literature stresses other board 
characteristics (board size, CEO duality, frequency of board meetings, executive 
compensation system, etc.) that may also impact board effectiveness.  
In addition to these factors, scholars have highlighted the role of external governance 
mechanisms (such as the market for corporate control and shareholder activism) as a means 
to encourage managers and directors to work effectively and to reduce agency problems 
(Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Denis & McConnel, 2003; Manne, 1965; Scharfstein, 1988).  
In the banking industry, the above-mentioned mechanisms are to some extent modified by the 
regulator (de Andres & Vallelado, 2008; Levine, 2004). Regulators constraint bank behaviour 
and complement other governance mechanisms in order to ensure a sound and prudent 
management by limiting agency problems as well. Moreover, it acts as a key bank 
stakeholder with a prominent impact on bank governance and ownership (Devriese, 
Dewatripont, Heremans, & Nguyen, 2004; Dewatripont & Tirole, 1994; Levene, 2004; 
Tirole, 1994). 
The literature has emphasized the influence of ownership on the effectiveness of the board. In 
general, the institutional setting of a company (namely the legal status of a company, such as: 
limited by shares, cooperative, etc.), affects ownership structure and governance 
characteristics as well as owner incentives to monitor top managers and board effectiveness. 
However, only few studies address this issue in banking empirically (Demsetz, Saidenberg, & 
Strahan, 1997; Levene, 2004; Saunders, Strock, & Travlos, 1990). 
Given the predictions of agency theory and the characteristics of the cooperative model in 
banking, we argue that the legal status of a cooperative could weaken the role of the board 
compared with that in joint-stock banks. In the following sections, we discuss the main 
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features of the cooperative model and develop our research hypotheses in the framework of 
the recent literature on bank boards. 
 
The cooperative model in banking and main governance characteristics 
At the origin of the cooperative banks were the needs of small and local rural communities 
for access to basic financial services which other banks had neglected because of the lower 
profit margin they could achieve in these markets. The pivotal role of cooperative banks was 
indeed to provide loans to its members, mainly farmers and artisans. Given this origin, 
cooperative banks are considered as part of the heterogeneous world of the not-for-profit 
organization, whose critical features are still present in current cooperative models (mainly 
the relevance of the social impact of their activities and some ownership issues). However, in 
the highly competitive banking system of the last decades, they have adapted their business 
model by engaging more and more in banking activities closely resembling those of joint 
stock banks (Gorton & Schmid, 1999). This evolution was supported by an increasing 
presence in cooperative banks of professional managers, in substitution of the members who 
once acted as managers. Competitive pressures and regulatory innovation were the main 
factors behind this change. On the one hand, large banks started to compete with cooperative 
banks in local markets by means of a widespread expansion of the number of branches. On 
the other hand, stricter banking regulation (Basle I to Basle II) imposed identical constraints 
on banks despite their institutional setting (joint stock, cooperative or saving banks). The 
literature emphasizes the special role of regulation in the banking industry which acts as an 
external governance mechanism (Devriese, Dewatripont, Heremans, & Nguyen, 2004; 
Dewatripont & Tirole, 1994; Levene, 2004; Tirole, 1994). To the extent that banking 
regulation constrains banks in a similar manner, they tend to respond similarly. One recent 
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example is in the regulatory arbitrage opportunity provided by securitization activities and 
exploited by both cooperative and joint stock banks before the financial crisis. 
However, cooperatives differ from joint-stock banks in several other aspects (Anguren Martin 
Sevillano & Marques, 2011; Llewellyn, 2005, 2006). The latter are established as joint-stock 
companies. Their goal is to maximize shareholder value, and they can be listed on the stock 
exchange. Shareholders are the owners of the bank and represent the residual claimants. On 
these aspects, cooperative banks maintain some features of not-for-profit organizations: they 
have multiple objectives and a weak ownership structure. The objective of cooperatives is 
less clearly defined as these organizations are motivated not only by profit maximization but 
by a combination of economic and social goals. Cooperative owners/members are also 
depositors and/or borrowers. Thus, cooperatives satisfy the needs of their members who are 
at the same time owners and customers. Consequently, profitability is not the main objective 
of such banks.  
As regards the ownership structure, the cooperative model has vaguely defined ownership 
rights
1
 (Chaddad & Cook, 2004). Cooperatives are characterized by a highly fragmented 
ownership structure with a large number of small owners. Cooperative members have one 
vote per capita, irrespective of the subscribed capital. Thus, it is not possible to concentrate 
ownership and its rights in one or a few major owners, and no individual or group is able to 
control the cooperative (Cornforth, 2004; Llewellyn, 2006). New members are equivalent to 
existing shareholders in terms of votes at the general annual meeting. There are limits to the 
amount of shares that owners may possess and to the profit distribution. Most of the profits 
are set aside as a reserve, whereas only a small portion can be distributed to members
2
. These 
limitations on ownership rights make it difficult to list a cooperative in a stock market and 
increase free rider problems and board incentives to extract private benefits (Clifford, 2007; 
Grossman & Hart, 1980; Hart & Moore, 1998; Maug, 1998).  
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Since in cooperatives the residual claims to be paid out are limited, any conceivable agency 
relationship between owners and managers could be partially clouded. However, a conflict of 
interest between members/owners and managers is still present. Notably, the cooperative 
model implies a separation of ownership and control (Rasmusen, 1988): managers are the 
custodians of the wealth of the bank and pursue objectives primarily in the interests of its 
members (Fontayne, 2007). Thus, managers could be tempted to manage this endowment in 
their own interest, for example, by increasing their benefits (higher wages, fringe benefits, 
etc.) (Rasmusen, 1988). Given the weakness of other cooperative governance mechanisms 
(i.e., shareholder activism, market for corporate control), the bank board remains the main 
tool by which the interests of cooperative members and managers are aligned (Llewellyn, 
2007; Staatz, 1983). 
Because of these characteristics, it has been argued that “the core governance problems of 
[cooperatives as in not-for-profit organizations] arise from their management having 
generally poor incentives and being shielded from the most potent disciplining devices in for-
profit firms, like hostile takeovers, proxy fights, or even independent directors” (Bolton & 
Mehran, 2006: 296). Moreover, given that the profit is not the unique cooperative objective, it 
is not an appropriate criterion to force managers to perform their jobs properly (Jegers, 2009). 
Therefore, the main issue is about how or whether cooperative directors have sufficient 
incentives to effectively monitor executives (Miller, 2002).  
Some authors highlight that directors have strong incentives to monitor managers and 
perform well because they are also owners. In fact, cooperatives are generally self-
administered since the directors are elected from amongst cooperative members (Shaw, 
2006). Thus they are inside directors with a long-term interest in the bank, and their 
investment is relatively illiquid (Ferri, Masciandaro, & Messori, 2001). Moreover, whereas 
cooperatives operate in restricted geographical areas and mainly in favor of their members, 
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peer monitoring should increase the effectiveness of social sanction (Hansmann, 1996). 
Given that in not-for-profit organizations’ board members offer their reputation as collateral 
(Handy, 1995), reputation is a strong incentive for cooperative directors to carry out their 
work well (Staatz, 1983). Directors aspire to be re-appointed and therefore must maintain a 
good reputation to avoid being penalized (Fama & Jensen, 1983).  
As discussed above, banking regulation complements other governance mechanisms and 
imposes further disciplinary measures that force board members to adopt more prudent 
behavior. Notably, the current regulation addresses the role and functions of the bank board 
despite the institutional setting of banks (BCBS, 2015). In particular, the BCBS states that 
“The board has overall responsibility for the bank, including approving and overseeing 
management’s implementation of the bank’s strategic objectives, governance framework and 
corporate culture.” (BCBS, 2015). Moreover, banking regulation also provides strong 
incentives to bank boards in order to ensure a sound and prudent management limiting bank 
risk-taking, hazardous decisions and agency problems (de Andres & Vallelado, 1998). If a 
bank performs poorly, the supervisory authority may sanction the board or have the power to 
dismiss the board members or oblige the bank to merge with another bank (Delis & 
Staikouras, 2011). In a number of jurisdictions, the supervisory authority may put the bank 
into special administration controlled by a supervisor-appointed administrator (Hupkes, 
2005). Therefore, from a regulatory perspective, cooperative boards have incentives to 
perform at the same level as JSBs boards.  
 
Related Literature and Research Hypotheses 
Even if cooperative bank directors have partial incentives to perform their jobs well, they 
may be tempted to fail to comply with their duty of care or collude with managers 
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(Holmstrom, 1999). There are at least four potential reasons why cooperative directors 
(compared with a corporate board) may not perform their tasks well. 
First, the high fragmentation of cooperative ownership, along with restrictions on profit 
distribution and the mechanism of one vote per capita, could reduce owners’ incentives to 
effectively monitor directors or managers. Thus, free-rider problems are more severe in 
cooperatives than in joint-stock companies (Borgen, 2004; Hart & Moore, 1998; Vitaliano, 
1983). These problems are also compounded by the complexity of the banking business, 
which can further weaken members' involvement in the life of the bank. Consequently, 
directors and managers may be tempted to extract private benefits or collude to protect their 
interests (Cuevas & Fischer, 2006; Odera, 2012). For example, managers may set higher 
wages for themselves, or the directors may press for loans in their favor or that of their 
friends. More generally, a higher level of managerial discretion or managerial inertia with a 
low propensity to change and low drive for innovation could characterize the boards of 
cooperatives. 
Second, the ambiguous figure of the owners, who are at the same time customers (depositors 
and borrowers) and employees, embodies an opaque and poorly defined corporate objective 
(Hart & Moore, 1998). Consequently, directors could fail in their task of monitoring 
management due to the ambiguity of cooperative objectives (Richards, Klein, & Wallburger, 
1998). Such ambiguity makes it difficult to establish suitable parameters for evaluating 
management and hinders the design of an effective reward system. However, because of 
weak property rights and the overlap between members and customers, cooperative members 
see themselves more as customers than as owners. Therefore, cooperative members might fail 
to monitor directors or managers because they are more interested in cheap credit or 
obtaining better conditions on their deposits than in exercising their property rights 
(Lewellyn, 2007).  
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Third, the market does not discipline cooperative directors and managers because of the non-
tradability of cooperative shares and the weak competition to which such banks are exposed 
in the local areas in which they operate (Alchian & Demsetz, 1973; Cook & Iliopoulos, 1999; 
Hart & Moore, 1998; Kontolaimou & Tsekouras, 2010).  
Finally, cooperative directors are generally elected from among members (Shaw, 2006), 
creating agency problems like inside/outside equity (Myers, 2000) and casting doubt on the 
independence of the member-directors and their propensity to act in the interest of all 
members (Fonteyne, 2007; Garoyan & Mohn, 1985). In this regard, Dunn, Crooks, Frederick, 
Kennedy, and Wadsworth (2002) reveal in a survey conducted on US agricultural 
cooperatives that directors often make decisions based not on economic but on political 
motivations. Reynolds (2004) shows that in US cooperatives, some managers support the 
benefits of appointing non-member directors to the board. Therefore, to the extent that the 
effects listed above outweigh board incentives to perform tasks well, we should expect the 
board of directors of cooperative banks to be relatively weaker than those of joint-stock 
banks.  
In order to compare the effectiveness of board of directors in cooperative and in JSB, we take 
the bank supervisory authority perspective and we use as proxies of board deficiency the 
number of sanctions imposed on board member by the supervisor and their severity. Thus we 
tested the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1. In cooperative banks, boards of directors show significant deficiencies 
pertaining to their duties (as proxied by regulatory sanctions) than boards of directors 
of joint-stock banks.  
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We then extend the analysis to observe whether Board of directors of cooperatives exhibit 
deficiencies in specific bank processes. We expect that deficiencies in the tasks of 
cooperative boards are especially likely in credit management. Fontayne (2007) highlights 
that unlike joint-stock banks, whose goal is to maximize shareholder value, cooperatives are 
designed to accumulate capital as they have to limit profit distribution to their members. This 
capital constitutes an intergenerational endowment available to current members that 
cooperative directors and managers have to enhance and preserve for the next generation. The 
author suggests that because of reduced incentives for members to effectively monitor top 
management in cooperatives, the latter could manage the cooperative endowment in their 
own interests or to the benefit of specific constituencies. Therefore, board members may be 
less effective in selecting and monitoring borrowers, facilitating loans to their friends or to 
members who elected them. Theoretically, the problem of soft budget constraints – discussed, 
for example, in Bolton and Sharfstein (1996) and Kornai, Maskin, and Roland (2003) – may 
explain this effect.  
Therefore, we developed the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2. In cooperative banks, boards of directors show significant deficiencies in 
credit management (as proxied by regulatory sanctions) than boards of directors of 
joint-stock banks. 
 
The Role of Board Turnover in Cooperative Board Deficiency 
We further extend our investigation to identify board characteristics that play a major role in 
explaining the deficiency of a cooperative board. In particular, we focus on board turnover. 
The turnover of board members or top managers is a disciplining mechanism that pressures 
these subjects to act in the interests of shareholders. In fact, the latter can threaten dismissal if 
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the former do not act in the interests of the owners (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003; Kaplan, 
1994). 
However, as noted above, in cooperative banks, the mechanisms by which board members 
are disciplined, including replacement of directors, are significantly weakened.  
Consequently, cooperative models increase the risk that board members will become 
powerful and entrenched as they are insulated and protected from internal and external 
pressures (Spear, 2004). The literature highlights that compared with a joint-stock bank, a 
cooperative has less board turnover (Battistin, Graziano, & Parigi, 2012; Ferri, Masciandaro, 
& Messori, 2001; Stefancic, 2014). Thus, cooperative directors remain in their position for 
long periods, even if they perform their duties inefficiently. Consequently, board members 
can exploit cooperative resources to pursue their advantage, for example, to protect their 
position. Directors may represent the interests of one group of members, perhaps those who 
elected them, and, in some cases, may represent only their own interests. Of course, the low 
level of board turnover negatively affects the independence of board members. Directors who 
sit on the board for too long tend to develop close relationships with managers; as a result, the 
effectiveness of their monitoring is weakened. Therefore, we aim to test the hypothesis that 
director turnover mediates the relationship between the cooperative model and the 
ineffectiveness of the board:  
 
Hypothesis 3. Board turnover mediates the relationship between cooperative banks and 
board deficiencies (proxied by regulatory sanctions). In particular, cooperative model 
characteristics lead to low board turnover, which in turn leads to high board 
deficiencies. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN: SAMPLE, VARIABLE AND ESTIMATION FRAMEWORK 
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Cooperative banks represent an important part of the banking system of many European 
economies (Groeneveld & Sjauw-Koen-Fa, 2009), with Austria, Finland, France, Germany, 
Italy and the Netherlands having the largest segments. In particular, European cooperative 
banks adhere to the European Association of Cooperative Banks (EACB) and share many 
characteristics (Fontayne, 2007; Shaw, 2006).  
To test our research hypotheses, we examined the Italian banking industry. Italy is an 
interesting case because it has a well-developed system of cooperative banks (Giagnocavo, 
Gerez, & Sforzi, 2012). Excluding the branches of foreign banks, the Italian banking sector 
currently consists of approximately 600 banks with a network of over 30,000 branches across 
the country. The cooperative is the most widespread form of bank in Italy, with a strong 
presence in local areas. Specifically, more than 70 percent of Italian banks are cooperatives, 
with joint-stock banks constituting the remaining 30 percent (Statistical Database of the Bank 
of Italy, 2015). 
Italian Banking Law (Legislative Decree no. 385/1993) stipulates that banks be established as 
joint-stock companies or as cooperatives (Art. 14). Cooperative status can be adopted by the 
Italian Banche di Credito Cooperativo (BCCs) (Art. 28) and by the Italian Banche Popolari 
Cooperative (BPs) (Tarantola, 2009). Although they are both cooperative banks, the BCCs 
and BPs have significant differences. The main similarity involves the voting rights of their 
members, who are entitled to one vote each. Despite this likeness, BCCs and BPs differ in 
several ways. In particular, BCCs can operate only in a limited area and serve principally 
their members; the members of the bank must reside or permanently work in the reference 
territory of the bank. Furthermore, the banks must allocate almost 70 percent of their annual 
net returns to the legal reserve. Finally, BCC members elect the directors from amongst 
themselves. Unlike BCCs, BPs operate everywhere and serve everyone (including non-
members). The BPs must allocate at least 10 percent of their net profits to the legal reserve, 
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whereas the remainder can be distributed to members. Finally, BPs can list their shares on a 
stock market. Therefore, BPs constitute a hybrid category with characteristics of both joint-
stock banks and BCCs. However, from a dimensional and operational viewpoint, BPs are 
closer to the first category. In fact, unlike BCCs, which are small banks that operate locally 
and offer simple and unsophisticated financial services, BPs are large banks and operate on a 
national or international scale, offering a wide range of financial products to meet the needs 
of various customers (Tarantola, 2009). Given the characteristics of BPs, to avoid 
confounding effects, our analysis is based only on Italian BCCs and joint-stock banks. 
 
Sample and Data Collection 
Our research hypotheses are tested on Italian banks in the period 2006-2012. Based on the 
statistical information system of the Bank of Italy, we identified the banks operating in Italy 
in the years under observation. In particular, we focus on banks established as joint-stock 
banks and on cooperative banks, namely, the Italian BCCs. We excluded from our analysis 
branches of foreign banks and BPs. We selected 2006 as the starting year of the analysis to 
avoid non-comparability issues in financial reporting as, prior to 2006, Italian banks drew up 
financial statements according to Italian accounting principles, whereas beginning in 2006, 
they prepared their financial statements according to IAS/IFRS accounting principles.   
We identified 727 cross-sectional units that were operative over the period under 
investigation (2006-2012). In this group, we also included banks that opened for business 
after 2006, as well as banks that closed down before 2012, with the constraint that 
information must be available for at least two consecutive years (Pathan, 2009). From this 
initial group, we thus eliminated 89 banks due to a lack of data or missing information. 
Finally, we excluded all year observations pertaining to banks that in the period under review, 
were subjected to extraordinary measures by the supervisory authority (special 
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administration, interim management, etc.). The final sample is composed of 638 banks: 198 
joint-stock banks and 440 cooperative banks. 
We collected our data from different databases. From the statistical information system of the 
Bank of Italy, we collected all demographic information (bank name, location, age, etc.) 
related to operative Italian banks over the time period and information about banks that 
acquired other banks in the same period. In addition, from the Bank of Italy website, we 
downloaded the Supervisory Bulletins to retrieve information on penalties imposed by the 
supervisory authority on the directors of Italian banks. The Bank of Italy publishes a monthly 
Supervisory Bulletin to make public sanctions imposed on the boards of directors of the 
banks. From these reports, we retrieved i) the governing bodies that were punished, ii) the list 
of infringements and relative description of board/director misconduct that constitutes the 
rationale for the penalty, iii) the bank processes in which the violations were detected, and iv) 
the (total) amount of the penalty.  
Data on bank board characteristics were hand-collected by consulting governance reports and 
financial statements available on bank websites. We checked and supplemented this 
information, when necessary, by consulting the ABI (Associazione Bancaria Italiana) 
Yearbooks. The Yearbook is published yearly by the Italian Banking Association and reports 
the composition of the governing bodies for each bank operating in Italy. Finally, we used the 
database Bankscope to collect bank balance-sheet data and further checked and supplemented 
these data by consulting the annual financial statements of each bank.  
The data collection returned an unbalanced panel of 4176 observations. In particular, only 
6.66 percent of yearly observations referred to banks whose directors were punished by the 
Authority. On average, 41 banks have been sanctioned each year. 
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The Dependent Variable - Sanctions of the supervisory authority issued to board 
members 
Given our aim of studying the board of directors in cooperative versus joint-stock banks, the 
use of financial performance as a proxy for the effectiveness of corporate governance 
(Dalton, Daily, Johnson, & Ellstrand, 1999; de Andres & Vallelado, 2008; Hermalin & 
Weisbach, 2003; Grove, Patelli, Victoravich, & Xu, 2011; Yermack, 1996) could raise 
concerns about the significance of our results (potential bias) as cooperative and joint-stock 
banks differ in their corporate objectives. As noted above, profitability is not the main 
cooperative objective (Fontayne, 2007).  
Therefore, to test our hypotheses, we decided to use the supervisory authority perspective and 
focus on internal governance systems, a limited but crucial component of bank governance 
(EBA, 2011). The Authority (in Italy, the Bank of Italy) monitors the internal governance 
system (art. 22, Directive 2006/48/EC), regardless of the institutional setting. Thus, we used 
as our dependent variable the sanctions imposed by the Bank of Italy as a measure of the 
quality of internal governance systems. In particular, the sanctions could be considered 
evidence of deficiencies in board functioning. This variable seems more appropriate for the 
study of differences between the governance of cooperative and joint-stock banks because it 
is independent of bank objectives and from the key bank stakeholders (shareholders, 
customers, etc.). 
Supervisory activity takes place on a regular basis and outside the control of the supervised 
banks. In particular, the Authority continuously monitors the behavior of banks through on-
site control and off-site control based on the regular information that banks are obliged to 
submit to the Authority (Bank of Italy, 2012). When the Authority detects director behavior 
that does not meet the standards of sound and prudent management, as required by the 
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regulation, the Authority is entitled to punish the directors and make the sanctions public 
through the Supervisory Bulletin.  
In particular, for each sanction reported in the Bulletin, the Authority lists the infringements 
that motivate the sanction. The motivation generally refers to deficiencies in specific area (i.e. 
credit management, risk management and internal controls). Detailed information on the 
causes of the deficiency is not provided. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that sanctions 
might be caused by directors pushing for a more favourable screening of a (large/relevant) 
customer even in the case of incomplete or missing documentation or if its solvency 
requirements are insufficient, stretching the loan policy of the bank beyond the limits set by 
internal regulations or by the supervisory provisions. Another example could be that they can 
approve employees’ activities related to operations which are above the risk limits imposed 
internally or externally by supervisory provisions and eventually generate losses.  
Notably, the Bulletin reports the identities of the directors
3
 responsible for these violations, 
and the penalty to be paid. The amount of the penalty is calculated by following the standards 
set by law and the supervisory provisions (Bank of Italy, 2012); the Authority has no 
discretionary power in its definition. In particular, the law sets the minimum and maximum 
limits on the amount of the penalty and the criteria used to determine it. Specifically, the law 
states the rules to determine the amount of the penalty, which is conditional on the 
seriousness of the violation. In this regard, the supervisory rules set by the Bank of Italy 
establish that the severity of the violation must be assessed by considering various factors, 
including the size of the bank, the effects that the violation has on the condition of the bank 
(i.e., credit losses), the activity that those responsible for the violation have taken to mitigate 
the consequences of the infringement (i.e., the violation is reported voluntarily during the 
inspection), etc. (Bank of Italy, 2012)
4
. The directors may appeal to the court to cancel the 
sanction.  
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In collecting this data, we consider that on average, there is a time gap of one year between 
the time when the board commits a violation and when the supervisory authority reports the 
sanction in the Bulletin. As our research covers the time span 2006-2012, we examined the 
Supervisory Bulletin over the period 2007 to 2013. To match as precisely as possible a 
sanction to a given year t when the violation was committed and not simply published by the 
Authority, we base our identification on the following information: 
 each director is elected to sit on a board for at least 3 years and then can be reelected or 
not.  
 due to the maturity of the directors’ mandate, the composition of the board changes every 
year on average, at least for some members.   
 more than 95 percent of the sanction reports we examined involved all board members 
(i.e., each of them is sanctioned).  
Therefore, we used the following criteria:  
1. We check the year(s) in which the directors who received the sanction were members of 
the board. 
2. To precisely assign the sanction to one of these years, we compare the composition of 
the board in each of them and the directors mentioned in the sanction report as composing 
the board at the time of the violation, allowing us to exploit changes in board compositions 
to determine the year of the violation. 
3. As a residual criterion, we allocate the sanction to the last year the directors were on the 
board, based on criterion 1. This last criterion was used in 5 percent of the sanctions’ 
allocation. 
Practically, for each bank i in year t, we collected the available information and created the 
following variables: i) a binary variable (1/0 - penalty/no penalty) to detect whether the board 
of a bank has been sanctioned; ii) a count variable to measure the number of infringements 
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reported by the Authority; iii) the amount of the fine imposed on the directors as a proxy for 
the severity of the violation. In addition, we recorded the rationale that justifies the sanction. 
The sanction report does not mention the specific facts but refers to a generic description of 
violations and to the rule that has been infringed, allowing us to assign the violations to 
specific bank processes. In more than 95 percent of the cases we examined, the Authority 
reported three types of violations: 
1. deficiencies in organizational and internal controls; 
2. deficiencies in credit management; 
3. deficiencies in risk management. 
Thus, we built three dummy variables for each of the above-mentioned categories.  
As sanctioned directors may file an appeal to the court, we also verify whether the court has 
dismissed the sanction. This information was obtained from the Supervisory Bulletin and 
from the website of the Italian administrative justice. 
 
Key Independent and Control Variables 
To test the first two hypotheses, which relate to the relationship between board deficiencies 
and bank institutional setting, our key independent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 
for cooperative banks. Joint-stock banks are the baseline category. 
To avoid spurious relationships between dependent and independent variables, we considered 
a set of control variables to account for bank and board characteristics and thus control the 
factors that may affect the quality of the board’s work and the effort of the Supervisory 
Authority in detecting board misconduct.  
The quality of governance is influenced by firm characteristics (Markarian & Parbonetti, 
2007). Therefore, a first group of variables controls for bank size, bank age and the ratio of 
loans to total assets as a proxy for the bank business model (de Andres & Vallelado, 2008). 
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We measure bank size as the natural log of total assets at the end of the fiscal year. Bank age 
is calculated as the natural log of the age of a bank.  
A second group of variables accounts for some differences across the banks that may have 
effects on the supervisory authority’s effort in detecting board deficiencies through regular 
controls. Indeed, we acknowledge that the Authority can exert greater or lesser effort given 
certain bank conditions, leading to a greater or lesser number of detected infringements that 
determine the amount of the penalty. In this group, we considered whether a bank is listed in 
a stock market; whether in year t, a bank acquired another bank; the bank risk; and abnormal 
profitability (Khanna, Kim, & Lu, 2014; Wang, 2013). In general, listed companies are more 
closely scrutinized by investors, authorities, the stock market, etc. (Dyck, Morse, & Zingales, 
2010). High risk, abnormal profitability and acquisitions may induce the Authority to exert 
greater effort in controlling the bank on a regular basis. We measure the bank’s risk level as 
the natural log of the ratio of non-performing loans (NPL) and gross loans as a proxy for 
credit risk taking. Abnormal profitability was measured with a dummy variable that was 
equal to 1 if the ROE of the bank i in the year t was higher or lower than the 90th or 10th 
percentile, respectively, and equal to 0 otherwise. Finally, we considered a dummy variable 
that was equal to 1 if bank i in time t fulfilled an acquisition and equal to 0 otherwise. 
As control variables on the board level, consistent with the agency perspective, we 
considered the following factors to explain the quality and deficiencies of the board.  
Board size was expressed as its natural log. In agency theory, board size is a key mechanism 
that impacts the effectiveness of board monitoring. The literature highlights the negative 
relationship between board size and the effectiveness of the board in carrying out its duties 
(Eisenberg, Sundgren, & Wells, 1998; Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003; Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 
1996). As board size increases, the board loses effectiveness and efficiency in both decision 
making and monitoring management. In other words, as board size grows, coordination 
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issues, free riding or shirking may increase. With mixed results, in banking literature board 
size is also considered to enhance board effectiveness (Adams & Mehran, 2011; de Andres & 
Vallelado, 2008; Grove, Patelli, Victoravich, & Xu, 2011; Pathan, 2009).  
Gender diversity was expressed as the proportion of female directors on board. It is one of 
the demographic characteristics that influences board effectiveness. In agency theory, 
scholars suggest that the presence of women on the board increases the independence of the 
board and improves the monitoring of management (Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 2003; 
Terjesen, Sealy, & Singh, 2009).  
Frequency of board meetings was expressed as its natural log and is a proxy of the 
effectiveness of the board in monitoring managers (Conger, Finegolda, & Lawler, 1998; de 
Andres & Vallelado, 2008; Grove, Patelli, Victoravich, & Xu, 2011).  
Board turnover. We calculated our proxy for board turnover following Eldenburg, 
Hermalin, Weisbach, & Wosinska (2004): 
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The literature shows that the replacement of the directors is a means to encourage them to do 
their job properly (Franks, Mayer, & Renneboog, 1995; Kang & Shivdasani, 1995; Kaplan, 
1994). In addition, board turnover is also a measure of the risk of entrenchment as low levels 
of director turnover increase the risk of entrenchment (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino and 
Buchholtz, 2001).  
In addition, we considered the governance model of banks. Italian commercial law stipulates 
three alternative governance models. The so-called traditional model is based on the presence 
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of a Board of Directors and a Board of Statutory Auditors. The Board of Directors guides and 
monitors management. The Board of Statutory Auditors is the body entrusted with 
monitoring board of directors by law (Melis, 2004). Specifically, it must verify that directors’ 
behavior complies with the law and the bank statute. In 2004, company law reform provided 
two additional governance models: a one-tier and a two-tier board that reflect the Anglo-
Saxon and the German model, respectively. However, the most widespread corporate 
governance model is the traditional one, which is used by more than 99 percent of Italian 
banks. The remaining portion uses a two-tier board model. No bank uses the one-tier model. 
Thus, we considered a dummy variable equal to 1 for banks using a two-tier governance 
model and equal to 0 otherwise. 
Although the literature considers that when the CEO serves as board chairman (CEO duality), 
board monitoring is affected, there are no conclusive data on the effects of CEO duality on 
corporate governance mechanisms (Baliga, Moyer, & Rao, 1996; Bhagat & Black, 2008; 
Brickley, Coles, & Jarrell, 1997; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1983; Rechner & Dalton, 
1991). We opted to consider this factor as a control variable. Notably, in Italian banks, CEO 
duality is limited to a few cases. Therefore, we excluded such cases from the analysis. 
However, in Italian banking industry, the presence of the role of the CEO is limited to larger 
and more complex financial institutions, e.g. listed banks. We highlight that based on the 
information collected from the annual year books of the Italian Banking Association the CEO 
is absent in cooperatives banks but also in the large majority of JSB in our sample (only 4 
percent are listed).  
Furthermore, the literature notes that the presence of independent directors on the board is 
beneficial. As their interests should not be aligned with those of managers, independent 
directors increase the quality of corporate governance because they contribute to better 
monitoring of managers (Boyd, 1994; Fama, 1980; Rechner & Dalton, 1991). However, we 
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omitted this variable from our estimations because independent directors are not easily 
identifiable in cooperative banks. As noted previously, in these banks, directors are elected 
from among the owners, who are also customers of the bank, as depositors or debtors. 
Therefore, it is doubtful that the directors are independent (BCBS, 2015; EACB, 2015; 
Garoyan & Mohn, 1985; Grove, Patelli, Victoravich, & Xu, 2011). For this reason, we 
considered it inappropriate to control for this variable, which would create multicollinearity 
problems with the dummy variable for cooperatives. Moreover, we argue that the board 
turnover that we consider as control variable can help in this regard because it can be 
expected that in the presence of high levels of director turnover, entrenchment problems are 
less likely to arise; therefore, board members should be able to closely control managers 
(Boubakri, Dionne, & Triki, 2008).  
Finally, to limit spurious relationships related to differences in the economic, social and 
cultural conditions of the various Italian geographical areas that could affect bank 
governance, we controlled for bank location (Beck, De Jonghe, & Schepens, 2013; Boytsun, 
Deloof, & Matthyssens, 2011; Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2004). We created three dummy 
variables for Northwest Italy, the Central and South and Islands
5
. The Northeast area is used 
as a baseline. 
All models are estimated taking into account time fixed effects to control for changes in 
macroeconomic conditions or in the supervisory approach.  
 
Summary statistics  
 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for our main variables. Table 2 shows an analysis of 
the frequency of sanctions imposed by the Authority on each type of bank and the temporal 
trend in the sanctions. Table 3 shows, for our main variables, a comparison of the means of 
joint-stock and cooperative banks and the difference in means between banks with sanctioned 
and non-sanctioned boards. In Table 5, we present the correlation matrix. 
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---------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------- 
 
As shown in Table 1, in 2006-2012, the supervisory authority reported on average 
approximately .13 infringements every year, or approximately one infringement every eight 
years per bank. The severity of the penalty imposed by the Authority was on average 11,422 
euros, with a maximum of approximately four million euros. 
In Table 2, we analyze the temporal trend of the sanctions imposed on the boards of Italian 
banks to shed light on how common it is to receive sanctions in more than one year. These 
data provide information on banks’ ability to repair the deficiencies detected by the 
Authority. Our results show that 219 (34 percent of our sample) bank boards were sanctioned 
at least once in the period 2006-2012 for a total of 288 events/sanctions. Thus, some boards 
were sanctioned several times in the period examined.  
---------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
-------------------- 
 
In particular, 55 boards were sanctioned two or more times; 13 were sanctioned three or more 
times; only one was sanctioned for a fourth time. Therefore, 164 (219 – 55) banks’ boards 
were sanctioned only once (75 percent), 42 (55 – 13) banks’ boards were sanctioned twice 
(19 percent), 12 (13 – 1) were sanctioned three times (5.5 percent), and one was sanctioned 
four times (0.5 percent). Therefore, only 25 percent of banks boards were sanctioned more 
than once. In other words, recidivism is not high, suggesting that sanctions tend to improve 
bank governance. Moreover, cooperative banks constitute the majority of sanctioned banks 
(see Table 2). Finally, we emphasize the temporal trend in sanctioned boards. In particular, 
2008, the start of the financial crisis in Italy, marks a significant increase in the number of 
banks whose board has been sanctioned by the Authority; this number remained high until 
2011.   
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As regards joint-stock and cooperative banks characteristics there are significant differences 
between these two groups of banks in terms of bank structure and board characteristics (see 
Table 3). In particular, compared with joint-stock banks, cooperative banks are smaller in size 
(t = 49.22, p .001) and are have been in business longer (t = – 27.26, p < .001). Their business 
model is primarily based on loan activity (t = – 4.60, p < .001), and they are at greater credit 
risk (t = – 15.80, p < .001). Compared with the boards of joint-stock banks, the boards of 
directors in cooperative banks tend to be smaller (t = 14.36, p < .001) and have a greater 
proportion of female directors (t = – 7.06, p < .001). In addition, in cooperative banks, board 
turnover is significantly lower than in joint-stock banks (t = 13.17, p < .001). Finally, there is 
no difference between these two groups of banks regarding the yearly number of 
infringements committed by their board of directors. However, the supervisory authority 
tends to impose more severe penalties on the boards of joint-stock banks than on those of 
cooperative banks (t = 3.77, p < .01), as expected.  
---------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
-------------------- 
 
Table 3 also shows that banks with sanctioned boards are younger (t = 3.29, p < .01), riskier 
(t = – 9.48, p < .001) and less profitable (t = 7.79, p < .001). In addition, the two groups of 
banks differ significantly in regard to board size and board turnover. In particular, compared 
with other banks, those whose boards were sanctioned tend to have larger boards (t = – 2.66, 
p < .01) and lower board turnover (t = 4.41, p < .001). To control for the large difference in 
the number of observations in each group (278 for sanctioned banks vs. 3898 for banks with 
no sanctions), we also ran the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test. The results (not 
tabulated) are aligned with those in Table 4.  
Finally, Pearson correlation coefficients between our main variables are quite low, suggesting 
that multicollinearity problems in our models are modest (Table 4).   
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---------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
-------------------- 
 
In particular, the number of infringements and the severity of the penalty are significantly 
associated with almost the same variables at the board and bank levels. The number of 
infringements and their severity are positively associated with credit risk (NPL/Gross loans) 
and the size of the board and negatively associated with profitability and board turnover (see 
Table 5). Therefore, the boards of banks most exposed to risk are more likely to commit a 
large number of violations, and these violations tend to be more severe. At the same time, the 
boards of banks with high profitability are less likely to commit violations, and the violations 
they do commit tend to be less severe. Finally, low board turnover is associated with a greater 
number of violations by directors, and the violations tend to be more severe. This association 
appears to confirm that low turnover increases the risk of directors carrying out their duties 
badly due to the greater probability of collusion with the managers or efforts to protect their 
position.  
Moreover bank age is negatively associated with the number of infringements, suggesting 
that in the older banks, the board commits fewer violations. Bank size is positively associated 
with the severity of the penalty, suggesting that in larger banks, the board commits more 
severe violations. 
 
Methodology 
 
To determine whether board deficiencies are higher in cooperative banks than in joint-stock 
banks, we constructed the following panel model:  
 
tikti,jti,10ti, Yearsvariables ControleCooperativ  esdeficienci Board ,          [1] 
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We measured board deficiencies as a dummy variable equal to 1 if the board of bank i in the 
year t was punished by the supervisory authority and equal to 0 otherwise. In addition to the 
control variables discussed above, we also consider the dependent variable lagged one year. 
This variable is important for the following reasons: 
- to control the effort of the Authority to control a bank whose board has already been 
sanctioned; 
- to determine whether the board of bank i that was sanctioned in a previous year (t – 1) will 
receive a sanction in the next year t. The sign and the significance of the coefficient provide 
information on the consequence of enforcement actions and therefore on the ability of a 
sanctioned board to improve its performance. 
To model the dependent variable, we used nonlinear models. Instead of OLS regression, the 
literature suggests employing a logit or probit model (Cameron & Trivedi, 1998). We chose 
the probit model because of its usefulness in dealing with certain specification problems 
(Wooldridge, 2009).  
In determining the specification of the model, we considered the panel structure of our 
dataset. Although we excluded a panel model with cross-section fixed effects (since our 
independent variable is time invariant), the likelihood ratio test rejected simple pooled 
specification. Therefore, we used the random-effects specification. However, the pooled 
specification yielded similar results (not tabulated).  
To verify that our results are not biased by the definition of our proxy for bank board 
deficiency, we re-estimated the model [1] using two alternative dependent variables with two 
regression techniques.  
In the first alternative, we used a count variable for the annual number of violations reported 
and imposed by the Authority with a negative binomial model (Cameron & Trivedi, 1998)
6
. 
The likelihood ratio test rejected the need for a panel specification of the model, so we 
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estimated a pooled negative binomial model. The Vuong test rejected a zero-inflated 
specification of the model (see Table 5, column 2). Thus, we estimated a standard negative 
binomial model.  
In the second alternative we used the amount of the sanction as a proxy of board deficiencies; 
compared with other board deficiency-related variables, this number includes information 
about the severity of the violations. The sanction amount is a continuous variable with a large 
proportion of zeros, such that its distribution is clearly right-skewed. In our dataset, only 6.89 
percent (288 on 4176) observations refers to sanctioned boards
7
. For that reason, the literature 
suggests a two-part model (Duan, Manning, Morris, & Newhouse, 1983, 1984).   
The two-part model assumes that two processes generate the data. The first process generates 
the probability that a board will be sanctioned by the supervisory authority. Conditional on 
the first process, the second determines the severity of the sanctions
8
. The first part of our 
model specifies a binary outcome model to explain the probability that a board will be 
sanctioned: 
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where X is a matrix of explanatory variables, θ is a vector of variable coefficients and G(·) is 
the probit (or, alternatively, logit) function. The model is estimated on the full sample. Now, 
suppose that for sanctioned boards, the following equation determines the severity of the 
sanctions: 
 
  XY                  [3] 
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where X is a matrix of explanatory variables and β is a vector of variable coefficients. This 
second part is conditional on Y > 0; as a consequence, it is estimated on the sample of non-
zero observations using an appropriate model (OLS, negative binomial for count, etc.). This 
model explains how the explanatory variables affect the severity of the sanctions.  
Given this methodological approach, we estimated the first part of the model on the whole 
sample of observations. We used a probit model with the dummy variable sanctioned/not 
sanctioned as the dependent variable. Evidently, this first part is similar to model [1]. The 
second part of the model uses only observations relating to banks whose board had been 
sanctioned in 2006-2012. For this second part, we used an OLS regression with the natural 
logarithm of the amount of the penalty as the dependent variable.  
To test the second hypothesis, we estimated a panel probit model with the probability that the 
board was sanctioned for deficiencies in credit management as the dependent variable.  
Indeed, the aim of this analysis was to exploit the different types of sanctions imposed by the 
Authority to further investigate whether cooperative board deficiencies are associated with 
any one type. As stated previously, cooperative board members may be more likely to be 
deficient in credit management. Although we do not have a specific hypothesis about board 
deficiencies in organization and internal controls and risk management, we also estimate and 
report the results of the models with the probability that the board had been sanctioned for 
deficiencies in these two areas as the dependent variable (see Table 6). The specification of 
these three models in terms of the independent and control variables is similar to that used in 
model [1]. 
Finally, to test the third hypothesis regarding the mediating effect of board turnover, we 
followed the approach of Baron and Kenny (1986) (Table 8). Therefore, as a first step, we 
tested for a significant relationship between the independent variable and the mediator by 
estimating the following panel model: 
34 
 
tikti,jti,10ti, Yearsvariables ControleCooperativ  turnover Board ,         [4] 
 
As control variables, we used the natural log of total assets, the natural log of bank age, the 
ratio of loans to total assets, the risk of the bank and the natural log of bank performance 
(ROE), which we lagged one period to prevent simultaneity bias. Finally, we used a dummy 
variable to account for the geographical location, a dummy variable for listed banks and a 
dummy for banks adopting a two-tier board model (Eriksson, Strøjer Madsen, Dilling-
Hansen, & Smith, 2001; Liu, Wang Zhao, & Ahlstrom, 2013).  
We then estimated the relationship between the independent variable (cooperative bank 
dummy) and the probability that the board may be punished. To test this relationship, we 
estimated again the model [1] but removing the board turnover variable. We also tested the 
relationship between the mediator and the dependent variable (model [1] less the independent 
variable). Finally, we combined the two previous models and tested whether the cooperative-
bank dummy variable affects the dependent variable through board turnover, as described in 
model [1]. The hypothesis on the existence of a mediating effect is supported if the mediator 
reduces or cancels the effect and/or the significance level of the relationship between the 
independent variable and the dependent variable. 
 
Endogeneity issue 
Endogeneity is a recurring issue in corporate governance research addressing the link 
between firm performance and governance practices. In this setting, endogeneity is mitigated 
by the source and construction of the dependent variable, which is based on the power of the 
supervisory authority to sanction the banks’ directors (our proxy for board deficiency). The 
probability that the board has been sanctioned, the number of detected violations and the 
amount of the assigned penalty are all essentially exogenous to the bank. First, the probability 
that the board comes to the attention of the Authority and then is sanctioned is exogenous 
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because the Authority supervises banks on a regular basis (both off-site and on-site), 
regardless of the willingness of the bank, its activities, their specific attributes or 
performance. However, we recognize that supervisory effort in detecting the violations may 
be affected by the bank’s overall conduct, and thus we control for that factor. Moreover, the 
amount of the penalty is also specified ex-ante on fixed criteria by regulation. Thus, it is 
exogenous to the bank (Wang, 2006).  
Furthermore, the independent variable of interest is an exogenous variable. Indeed, in 
banking industry regulation affects the corporate governance of banks, first by fixing the 
institutional settings that banks can adopt. Therefore, banks are not free to use the optimal 
ownership structure for them or adapt it to their needs (Gorton & Schmid, 1999). In our 
dataset, the dummy variable for cooperative bank status is time-invariant. Therefore, there is 
no simultaneity bias between the institutional setting of a bank and the deficiencies of the 
board. 
 
RESULTS 
In this section, we present the results of our analyses. In Table 5, we show the results of our 
regression models for Hypothesis 1 (the association between bank institutional setting and 
deficiencies in the boards of directors). In particular, we predicted a positive association 
between cooperative-bank status and board deficiencies. We first measured board 
deficiencies using the probability that the board had been sanctioned by the supervisory 
authority. In column (1), we show the results of the probit panel model estimated with 
clustered robust standard errors. 
---------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
-------------------- 
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We found a positive and significant association between the cooperative-status dummy 
variable and the dependent variable (β = .35, p < .01). Therefore, we conclude that the boards 
of directors of cooperative banks are more likely to incur sanctions, suggesting that they are 
more likely to be deficient in their tasks than the boards of joint-stock banks. Thus, our first 
hypothesis was not rejected. Our control variables have the expected signs, and the 
coefficients reveal that low board turnover leads to high board deficiency. 
In column (2) of Table 5, we report the estimates of a standard negative binomial model 
with the number of infringements reported by the supervisory authority to the board of the 
bank as the dependent variable. We estimated the model using clustered robust standard 
errors. The results in column (2) are in line with those in column (1). In particular, it appears 
that the boards of cooperative banks on average commit more violations than the boards of 
joint-stock banks (β = .55, p < .05).  
Finally, in column (3), we present the results of the two-part model with the amount of the 
penalty imposed on the board by the supervisory authority as the dependent variable. The 
model is estimated with a simultaneous covariance matrix of the sandwich/robust type, which 
was obtained by combining the estimation results of the first and second parts. In column 
(3a), we show the results of the probit model that represents the first part of the model. As 
expected, the results of this first part are similar to those in column (1) as the dependent 
variable is the same. In column (3b), we show the results of the second part of the model, an 
OLS model estimated on non-zero observations. We found a significant and negative 
relationship between cooperative bank status and the severity of sanctions imposed by the 
Authority, suggesting that although the boards of cooperative banks have a higher probability 
of incurring penalties, those penalties tend to be less severe (lower amounts). However, this 
effect may be influenced by the regulatory criteria used to assess the penalty as the severity of 
penalties is related to the size of the bank in terms of total assets (Bank of Italy, 2012). 
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Therefore, in column (3c), we show the results of the model that includes an interaction term 
between bank size and the cooperative-status dummy variable. We note that the introduction 
of the interaction term has improved the model. Compared with the reduced model, the full 
model has a higher adjusted R
2 
of 1.71 percent. Furthermore, the addition of the interaction 
term is truly informative (ΔF = 7.31, p < .01). As for the other models, we find that the 
coefficient of the variable cooperatives dummy is positive and significant (β = 4.20, p < .01) 
and that of the moderator variable (bank size) is positive and significant (β = .24, p < .001), 
whereas the interaction term is significant and negative (β = -.23, p < .01). The regression 
results do not reject the hypothesis that bank size moderates the relationship between the 
cooperative-status dummy variable and the severity of violation. Overall, we can conclude 
that our first hypothesis is not rejected in this case. However, the violations are more severe 
in small cooperative banks than in large ones.  
Finally, we note that the sign of the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable of one 
year is negative in column (1), (2) and (3a), whereas it is positive in column (3b) and (3c). 
Although the coefficients are not significant, their signs suggest that i) having received a 
penalty in year (t – 1), it a reduced probability of receiving a sanction in the next year is 
expected; ii) an increase in reported violations in year (t – 1) predicts a decrease in the 
violations of year t; iii) with regard to the severity, the sign of the coefficient suggests that 
where the board is sanctioned in two consecutive years, usually the violation of the following 
year is more serious than that of the previous year. We also reach the same conclusions by the 
dependent variable lagged two years (not tabulated). In addition, we estimated the models 
separately for cooperative banks and joint-stock banks (not tabulated). The signs of the 
lagged dependent variable are consistent with the previous ones; therefore, they show no 
difference between the two groups of banks. Even these estimates return insignificant 
coefficients for the lagged dependent variable. 
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With respect to Hypothesis 2, in Table 6, we present the results of the probit models with 
the probability that the bank board incurs penalties for deficiencies in credit management as 
the dependent variable. The regressors of this model are the same as those considered for the 
estimation of model [1] (column 1 of Table 5). The results show that the probability of 
sanctions on the boards of cooperative banks is higher for deficiencies in credit management 
(β = .65, p < .001). Thus, Hypothesis 2 is not rejected. As noted previously, for comparative 
purposes, Table 6 presents the estimation of this model using as a dependent variable the 
probability that the bank board incurs penalties for deficiencies in i) organization and internal 
controls and ii) risk management. With only marginal significance, the probability of 
sanctions on the board of cooperative banks is higher for deficiencies in organization and 
internal control (β = .23, p < .10). On the contrary, cooperative and joint-stock banks do not 
differ significantly as regards board deficiencies in risk management (β = .14, p > .10).  
---------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
-------------------- 
Finally, to test the mediating effect of board turnover (Hypothesis 3), we first estimate the 
model in equation [4]. Accordingly, Table 7 presents in column (2) the results estimated 
using the robust standard errors of model [4], which tests the relationship between our main 
independent variable (the cooperative-status dummy variable) and the mediator variable, 
namely, board turnover; column (4) shows the results of the model that analyzes the influence 
of the independent variable on the dependent variable, namely, the probability of sanctions 
imposed on a bank board; column (5) shows the results of the model that analyzes the 
relationship between the mediator and the dependent variable; column (6) shows the results 
of the full model that contains as regressors the independent and the mediator variables. 
Finally, columns (1) and (3) contain only control variables.   
---------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
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Table 7 indicates that our key independent variable (the dummy for cooperative bank 
status) has a highly significant and negative effect on board turnover (β = –.05, p < .001) and 
a highly significant and positive effect on the probability of sanctions being imposed on a 
bank board (β = .42, p < .001). In particular, in column (5), we show that the mediator 
variable negatively affects the probability of sanctions imposed on a bank board (β = –1.88, p 
< .001). Finally, in column (6), we show that when the mediator is added to the model with 
the independent variable, the latter remains significant (β = .35, p < .01) as well as the 
mediator variable (β = –1.80, p < .001). However, the coefficient of the cooperative-status 
dummy variable is reduced from .42 (in column 4) to .35 (column 6), and the significance 
level of the coefficient is reduced from .001 to .01. Thus, we can conclude that board 
turnover partially mediates the relationship between the cooperative status of a bank and the 
probability that its board has been sanctioned by the supervisory authority. As a consequence, 
Hypothesis 3 is partially supported. 
 
Robustness Checks  
Table 5 shows that our results are robust to changes in the dependent variable, our proxy 
for board deficiency, and to different model specifications. Using either the number of 
violations or the severity of the penalty instead of the probability that sanctions were imposed 
on the board as the dependent variable, the results are consistent with previous specifications. 
Moreover, we conducted the following robustness tests. First, we re-estimated the models in 
Table 5 using bootstrapped robust standard errors with 500 replicates (Cameron & Trivedi, 
2010). The results confirm those shown in Table 5. Using the same technique, we re-
estimated the models presented in Tables 6 and 7. Additionally, the bootstrapped robust 
standard errors generally confirm the previous results. The only exception is for the model 
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shown in column (1) of Table 6, in which the use of bootstrapped robust standard errors 
highlights the non-significance of the cooperative-status dummy variable. We also estimated 
the models in Tables 5, 6 and 7 excluding the dependent variable lagged one year from the 
regressors to assess the effects of serial correlation. The results were unchanged.  
In addition, we tested the effects of balancing our panel. Despite the loss of approximately 
800 observations, coefficients obtained by the re-estimation of previous models on a balanced 
panel did not change our results.  
Given the differences between cooperative and joint-stock banks, a further robustness test is 
necessary to control for the possibility that the sanctions we analyzed are not directly related 
to the ineffectiveness of the boards but to the bank institutional settings. In other words, we 
need to control for the possibility that cooperatives are structurally more likely to be 
sanctioned, despite their board members. To control for this possibility, we used the financial 
crisis to divide our time period into two sub-periods: a pre-crisis period from 2006 to 2007 
and a crisis period from 2008 to 2012. Although the financial and credit crisis broke out  
globally in late 2007, the effect on the Italian economy and banking system is, according to 
the Bank of Italy, evident beginning in 2008 (Annual Report, Bank of Italy, 2009). This year 
also corresponds to the first record of a negative GDP in Italy. For the second period, it was 
difficult to detect any recovery because the sovereign debt crisis strongly affected Italy 
between 2011 and 2012. Therefore, we considered the entire period from 2008 to 2012 as the 
crisis period. Using a balanced panel, we run a pre-post treatment analysis where banks in the 
pre-crisis period serve as their own control for the crisis period (Greene, 2012). This 
procedure would alleviate firm specific factors that may be influencing the test variables. 
Table 8 shows the results of this analysis.   
---------------- 
Insert Table 8 about here 
-------------------- 
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We find that when the board deficiency is proxied by both the probability of sanction 
(column 1) and the number of infringements (column 2), it does not emerge any significant 
difference between JSBs and cooperatives. The interaction term between the Cooperative 
dummy and the Crisis dummy is not significant in both estimations and thus the slopes of the 
relationship between bank institutional setting and board deficiency in the pre-post periods do 
not differ significantly for JSBs and cooperatives. Additionally, we find that the variable 
Cooperative is not significant as well. Overall, these evidences suggest that there is no 
difference between the two types of banks with respect to the sanctioning process. In a post 
hoc analysis of the predictive marginal effects of the interaction term, we find evidence that 
in the pre-crisis period cooperatives had a slightly higher and significantly (p < .05) 
probability to be sanctioned than JSB banks. During the crisis, however, this evidence is 
weaker and insignificant (p > .10) so that JSB and cooperatives have indeed very similar 
probability of being sanctioned. Remarkably, when the dependent variable is the number of 
infringements, we do not observe any significant difference in slopes between Cooperatives 
and JSBs in pre-crisis and crisis period. As to the gravity of sanctions, in column (3b) of 
Table 8, we find only a weak significance for the cooperative dummy (β = 4.99, p < .10), 
based on a relative smaller number of observations compared to the unbalanced panel. 
Therefore, these results offer comprehensive evidences in support of the view that there is no 
a persistent and significant disparity in the treatment of the supervisory authority when 
dealing with cooperatives or JSBs. 
Furthermore, in line with the literature on corporate fraud, we re-estimated the probit 
model in column (1) of Table 5 using a bivariate probit model to account for the partial 
observability of board misconduct (Poirier, 1980). The literature shows that the probability of 
observing bad behavior is the result of two latent probabilities, i.e., the probability that the 
board engages in bad behavior and the likelihood of detection (Khanna, Kim, & Lu, 2014; 
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Nguyen, Hagendorff, & Eshraghi, 2015; Wang, 2013). However, we are able to observe only 
the bad behavior that has been detected. It has thus been argued that a standard probit model 
is unable to differentiate between the two probabilities. For this reason, the literature suggests 
using a bivariate probit model to account for the fact that the probability of observing a 
board's bad behavior is determined by the two distinct and latent processes mentioned above. 
This model assumes that the two processes are correlated with each other (Cameron & 
Trivedi, 2010). However, if the two processes are not correlated, the bivariate probit model 
may not be necessary, and a standard probit model is suitable. In our case, the results of the 
bivariate probit model rejected the existence of a significant correlation between the two 
processes, so we opted for an estimate based on a standard probit model. The low 
correlations, in our setting, may be attributable to the regularity of the supervisory authority’s 
controls on board behavior. We anticipate that the results of the bivariate probit model will 
confirm those obtained with the standard probit model. All the tables related to the robustness 
test that are not reported here are available upon request. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study contributes to the literature on bank governance in several ways. Although 
bank governance is a subject of wide debate in the literature, to the authors’ knowledge, no 
empirical study has focused on cooperative bank governance. Based on the peculiar 
characteristics of the cooperative model in banking, we suggested and empirically 
demonstrated that the boards of directors of cooperative banks are more ineffective than those 
of joint-stock banks; this is true for small cooperatives in particular. Furthermore, we suggest 
that board turnover significantly mediates the relationship between the cooperative model and 
board ineffectiveness.  
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This empirical analysis focused on all operative Italian banks over the period 2006-2012, 
with a final sample of 638 cross-sectional units. Compared with other works on corporate 
governance, our work is distinctive from a theoretical and methodological standpoint. 
Although the current literature on corporate governance focuses on the shareholder 
perspective, using financial performance as a proxy for the effectiveness of governance 
mechanisms, in our study, we take the supervisory authority perspective and focus on internal 
governance systems. The effectiveness of corporate governance is thus measured in terms of 
board deficiency detected by the Italian supervisory authority; the proxy for this variable is 
the sanctions for misconduct inflicted on the boards of directors of Italian banks.  
Our empirical evidence does not lead us to reject the hypothesis that cooperative boards 
are more ineffective than boards of joint-stock banks. In particular, regression results show 
that cooperative boards have on average a higher probability of being deficient, incurring a 
greater number of violations and, especially for small cooperatives, being more severely 
penalized. These findings support the theory that emphasizes the drawbacks of governance in 
cooperative banks (Llewellyn, 2006, 2007). Our results also highlight a specific bank process 
whereby board deficiencies are more likely to occur in cooperative banks than in joint-stock 
banks: credit management. Cooperative banks operate in limited local areas and mainly serve 
their members. This arrangement is considered beneficial for cooperatives because it reduces 
moral hazard through peer monitoring to enhance credit quality (Banerjee, Besley, & 
Guinnane, 1994). However, the close relations that are established between the directors and 
the bank’s customers, who are generally also the owners of the bank, can lead to negative 
effects because board members may be tempted to favor their friends, their own interests, or 
those of the coalition of owners who elected them rather than promote the welfare of all. 
Consequently, they may also finance borrowers with financial problems or put less effort into 
monitoring borrowers.  
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To explain these findings, we investigated the effect of board turnover as a potential 
mediating variable in the relationship between the cooperative bank model and board 
deficiencies. Consistent with the previous literature, our results show that in cooperatives, 
board turnover is lower than in joint-stock banks (Battistin, Graziano, & Parigi, 2012). 
Additionally, our research contributes to the literature by demonstrating the existence of a 
partial but significant mediating effect of board turnover on the relationship between the 
cooperative model and board deficiency. Consequently, the cooperative model has an indirect 
impact on board ineffectiveness through board turnover. Therefore, we can conclude that in 
cooperative banks, board deficiencies are partially explained by low board turnover. This 
situation increases the risk, on one hand, that cooperative directors will build close 
relationships with managers and become less objective in their monitoring. On the other 
hand, they could become powerful and use the bank to pursue their own interests (for 
example, by lending money to less reliable borrowers). Although these results are, again, in 
line with agency theory, they also have practical implications for bank corporate governance 
regulations as they suggest the need to consider low board turnover as an important weakness 
of the boards of cooperative banks. More generally, further research should help clarify the 
extent and the implications of the specialness of cooperative banks’ governance model, which 
has been neglected thus far, and to consider how regulators should address this model in 
terms of new standards. This research should also consider an international perspective.  
 
 
NOTES 
 
 
1 
Not-for-profit organizations are typically characterized by ambiguous ownership (Cornforth, 
2003; Miller, 2002), except for cooperatives where the ownership is well-defined. The 
members are the owners as they have underwritten the shares and have their voting rights.
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2 
Cooperatives are typically not subject to the non-distribution constraint that is the defining 
characteristics of not-for-profit organizations (Hansmann, 1980; Levi & Davis, 2008). 
3 
More than 95 percent of all the sanctions that we examined involve the bank board as a 
whole. In only a few cases, we found sanctions that involved a limited number of directors. 
However, in the latter cases, the chairman was always involved. 
4 
Sanctioned directors must pay the amount due within 30 days from the notification of the 
decision. The bank is jointly liable with the sanctioned directors but has the right to claim 
against them. 
5
 This geographical breakdown is the same as those used by the Italian bureau of statistics 
(ISTAT) and by EUROSTAT. 
6
 As suggested by the literature, count variables should be modeled using a Poisson model or 
a negative binomial regression (Cameron & Trivedi, 1998). The first model is suitable when 
the conditional variance and the conditional mean of the dependent count variable are not 
different, in other words, when there is no data overdispersion. On the contrary, when 
overdispersion arises, (i.e., when the variance of the dependent is significantly higher than 
their average), the negative binomial model is more appropriate. Our analysis shows 
significant data overdispersion; therefore, we used a negative binomial model. 
7
 In these cases, the use of an OLS regression to model such a variable is unsuitable for 
several reasons, primarily because it would yield negative values, although the amount of a 
penalty is always greater than or equal to 0. 
8 
Given that zero sanctions are a frequent data point, the factors that explain the probability of 
being sanctioned may be not the same as those that affect the severity of sanctions. Therefore, 
it would be appropriate to use two models to explain these two phenomena. 
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TABLE 1 
Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Bank size (€/billion) 4176 3.92 24.5 .003214 438 
Bank age (year) 4176 58.06 43.60 .5 183 
Loans/TA 4176 .66 .18 .006 .99 
NPL/Gross Loan 3832 8.25 6.53 0 215.87 
Roe 4175 .05 .09 -.74 .91 
Board size 4176 9.74 2.84 5 24 
Gender diversity 4176 .05 .07 0 .44 
Board turnover 4172 .13 .20 0 1.42 
No of Board meetings 3842 16.05 2.76 8 25 
No of infringements 4176 .13 .56 0 10 
Severity of penalty (€/thousand) 4176 11.42 101.16 0 4,008.77 
Bank size denotes the amount of total assets. Bank age denotes the age of a bank. 
Loans/TA is the ratio of loans to total assets as a proxy for the bank business model. 
NPL/Gross Loans is a measure of bank risk, expressed as the ratio between non-
performing loans and gross loans. ROE is the return on equity. Board size denotes the 
number of board members. Gender diversity denotes the proportion of female members 
on the board. Board meetings denotes the frequency of board meetings. Board turnover 
denotes the board members’ turnover. No. of infringements denotes the number of 
notified violations. Severity of penalty denotes the amount (€/000) of the penalty 
imposed on board members by the Authority.  
 
 
TABLE 2 
Time Trend and Recidivism of Sanctioned Boards by Institutional Setting   
 
No. of banks with 
sanctioned board 
members: 
200
6 
200
7 
200
8 
200
9 
201
0 
201
1 
201
2 
Total JSB
d
 Coop.
e
 
 Pre-crisis Crisis  No
. 
% No. % 
the first time 39 34 37 31 36 32 10 219 63 32% 156 35% 
the second time
a
 - 4 10 8 12 10 11 55 13 6.7% 42 9.5% 
the third time
b
 - - 1 2 2 5 3 13 3 1.5% 10 2.3% 
the fourth time
c
 - - - - - - 1 1 0 0% 1 0.2% 
Total No. of sanctions 39 38 48 41 50 47 25 288   
a
 No. of banks sanctioned for the second time, having already received a penalty in a previous year 
b 
No. of banks sanctioned for the third time, having already received two penalties in two of previous 
years 
c 
No. of banks sanctioned for the fourth time, having already received three penalties in three of previous 
years 
d, e 
The columns JSB and Coop. show the number (No) of sanctioned joint-stock and cooperative banks 
and their percentage (%) over the total number of joint-stock (198) and cooperative (440) banks, 
respectively.
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TABLE 3 
Univariate Tests of Difference Between Joint-Stock and Cooperative Banks and 
between Sanctioned and Non-Sanctioned Banks 
 
Variable Joint- 
Stock 
Banks 
Cooperative 
Banks 
t-value Non-
Sanctioned 
Sanctioned t-value 
       
Bank size (ln) 21.50 19.32 49.22*** 20.01 19.88 1.29 
Bank age (ln) 2.97 3.90 -27.26*** 3.62 3.40 3.29** 
Loans/TA .64 .67 -4.60*** .66 .66 .23 
NPL/Gross Loan (ln) 1.79 2.14 -15.80*** 2.01 2.38 -9.48*** 
Roe (ln) .04 .04 -.57 .045 -.001 7.79*** 
Board size (ln) 2.33 2.19 14.36*** 2.23 2.28 -2.66** 
Gender diversity .04 .05 -7.06*** .05 .05 .07 
Board turnover (ln) .15 .08 13.17*** .11 .07 4.41*** 
No. of Board meetings (ln) 2.77 2.76 1.32† 2.76 2.75 1.43† 
No. of infringements .12 .13 -.69    
Severity of penalty (€/thousand) 20.13 7.44 3.77**    
       
No. of observations 1309 2867  278 3898  
Bank size denotes the natural logarithm of total assets. Bank age denotes the natural logarithm of the age of a 
bank. Loans/TA is the ratio of loans to total assets as a proxy for the bank business model. NPL/Gross Loans is a 
measure of bank risk, expressed as the natural logarithm of non-performing loans on gross loans. ROE is the 
natural logarithm of return on equity. Board size is the natural logarithm of the number of board members. 
Gender diversity denotes the proportion of female members on the board. Board turnover denotes the natural 
logarithm of board members’ turnover. Board meetings denotes the natural logarithm of the frequency of board 
meetings. No. of infringements denotes the number of notified violations. Severity of penalty denotes the amount 
(€/000) of the penalty imposed on board members by the Authority.  
† p < .10 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
*** p < .001 
 
TABLE 4 
Correlation Matrix – Pearson Coefficients 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Bank size (ln) 1           
2. Bank age(ln) -.08** 1          
3. Loans/TA .14** .16** 1         
4. NPL/Gross Loan (ln) -.22** .11** .03 1        
5. Roe (ln)  .10** .06** -.09** -.36** 1       
6. Board size .47** -.15** .08** -.10** .05** 1      
7. Gender diversity -.05** .08** .04* .09** -.04** .02 1     
8. Board turnover  .11** -.17** -.06** .04* -.10** .07** .08** 1    
9. Board meetings  .03 -.01 -.004 -.001 .01 .003 -.003 .02 1   
10. No. of infringements -.01 -.06** .001 .13** -.13** .04** -.01 -.06** -.02 1  
11. Severity of penalty  .09** -.02 .01 .04** -.05** .08** -.01 -.03* -.002 .55** 1 
Bank size denotes the natural logarithm of total assets. Bank age denotes the natural logarithm of the age of a bank. 
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Loans/TA is the ratio of loans to total assets as a proxy for the bank business model. NPL/Gross Loans is a measure 
of bank risk, expressed as the natural logarithm of non-performing loans on gross loans. ROE is the natural 
logarithm of return on equity. Board size is the natural logarithm of the number of board members. Gender diversity 
denotes the proportion of female members on the board. Board turnover denotes the natural logarithm of board 
members’ turnover. Board meetings denotes the natural logarithm of the frequency of board meetings. No. of 
infringements denotes the number of notified violations. Severity of penalty denotes the amount (€) of the penalty 
imposed on board members by the Authority.  
† p < .10 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
*** p < .001 
 
 
 
TABLE 5 
Regression Results of Board Deficiency 
Dependent Variable 
Prob. 
(sanction) 
 
No. of 
infringements 
 
Two-part model:  
Severity of penalty 
Estimation Method 
Probit 
model 
 
Negative 
binomial model 
 
Part I:  
Binary model 
Part II:  
OLS Regression 
 (1)  (2)  (3a) (3b) (3c) 
Control variables        
Bank size (ln) .02  .01  .02 .13* .24*** 
 (.44)  (.12)  (.49) (2.45) (3.76) 
Bank age (ln) -.17***  -.28***  -.15*** -.04 -.03 
 (-4.01)  (-3.91)  (-4.09) (-.80) (-.67) 
Loans/TA  .58*  1.39*  .57† .38 .48 
 (1.97)  (2.40)  (1.89) (1.18) (1.49) 
NPL/Gross loans (ln) .60***  1.16***  .55*** .24* .22* 
 (7.52)  (6.86)  (7.06) (2.37) (2.19) 
Abnormal ROE .59***  1.08***  .59*** .24† .28* 
 (5.33)  (5.56)  (5.52) (1.80) (2.11) 
M&A .37†  1.08*  .32 .47 .35 
 (1.76)  (2.23)  (1.49) (1.24) (.97) 
Listed bank .74***  1.79***  .69*** .57* .41 
 (3.40)  (4.19)  (3.30) (2.13) (1.52) 
C.G. model .17  .01  .07 -.03 -.35 
 (.28)  (.00)  (.11) (-.11) (-1.22) 
Board size (ln) .27†  .46  .25 .69*** .73*** 
 (1.66)  (1.50)  (1.59) (3.46) (3.74) 
Gender diversity .27  .30  .19 -.89 -.69 
 (.53)  (.31)  (.43) (-1.25) (-.98) 
Board meetings (ln) -.25  -.32  -.24 .16 .14 
 (-1.25)  (-.79)  (-1.36) (.58) (.51) 
Board turnover (ln) -1.79***  -3.23***  -1.66*** .23 .25 
 (-5.96)  (-5.18)  (-5.51) (.59) (.63) 
Sanctions(t – 1) -.21  -.001  -.015 .003 .01 
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 (-1.36)  (-.01)  (-.12) (.22) (.42) 
Independent variable        
Cooperative  .35**  .55*  .34** -.38* 4.20** 
 (2.62)  (2.19)  (2.85) (-2.21) (2.72) 
Cooperative × Bank size       -.23** 
       (-2.90) 
Intercept -5.79***  -8.22***  -5.60*** 6.27*** 3.92** 
 (-5.90)  (-4.21)  (-6.37) (4.80) (2.63) 
Year dummies Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Location dummies Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations  3829  3829  3829 278 278 
Wald χ2 184.35***  293.34***  227.85***   
LR test against pooled 5.88**  .37     
LR test against a Poisson   453.67***     
Vuong test   .34     
ΔF-value      5.98*** 7.31** 
Adj. R
2 
     .29 .31 
This table reports the regression results on board deficiency for cooperative vs. joint-stock banks. 
In column (1), we examine whether the board of a cooperative bank is more likely to incur 
sanctions by the Supervisory Authority than the board of joint-stock banks. In column (2), we 
examine whether the board of cooperative banks incurs more infringements than the board of 
joint-stock banks. In column (3), we examine whether board deficiency is more severe in 
cooperative than in joint-stock banks. Bank size denotes the natural logarithm of total assets. Bank 
age denotes the natural logarithm of the age of a bank. Loans/TA is the ratio of loans on total 
assets as a proxy for the bank business model. NPL/Gross Loans is a measure of bank risk, 
measured as the natural logarithm of non-performing loans on gross loans. Abnormal ROE is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the ROE of a bank is higher or lower than the 90th or 10th 
percentile, respectively. M&A is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank acquires another bank in a 
given year. Listed bank is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank is listed in a stock exchange 
market. C.G. model is a dummy variable equal to 1 for banks using a two-tier governance model. 
Board size is the natural logarithm of the number of board members. Gender diversity denotes the 
proportion of female members on the board. Board meetings denotes the natural logarithm of the 
frequency of board meetings. Board turnover denotes the natural logarithm of board member 
turnover. Sanctions(t – 1) is the dependent variable lagged one year. Cooperative is a dummy equal 
to 1 if a bank is a cooperative and 0 otherwise. Year and location dummies control for year and 
location fixed effects. Z values are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the 
bank level.  
† p < .10 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
*** p < .001   
 
 
TABLE 6  
Probit Regression Results of Board Deficiency by Type of Violation 
 
Dependent variable Probability of sanctions for deficiencies in 
 
organization and  
internal control 
 
credit 
management 
 
risk  
management 
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 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Control variables      
Bank size (ln) .05  .03  -.08 
 (1.10)  (.68)  (-1.14) 
Bank age (ln) -.20***  -.14**  -.21** 
 (-4.12)  (-2.87)  (-2.77) 
Loans/TA  .36  1.54***  1.11* 
 (1.12)  (3.58)  (1.99) 
NPL/Gross loans (ln) .51***  .82***  .38** 
 (5.60)  (7.67)  (2.77) 
Abnormal ROE .50***  .61***  .33† 
 (4.12)  (4.73)  (1.91) 
M&A .29  .09  .50 
 (1.25)  (.31)  (1.60) 
Listed bank .48†  .97***  1.54*** 
 (1.95)  (3.56)  (4.11) 
C.G. model .32  -5.66  -4.87 
 (.50)  (-.00)  (-.01) 
Board size (ln) .18  .07  -.09 
 (1.00)  (.37)  (-.32) 
Gender diversity .39  .33  .38 
 (.67)  (.55)  (.45) 
Board meetings (ln) -.18  -.13  -.03 
 (-.79)  (-.56)  (-.08) 
Board turnover (ln) -1.98***  -1.90***  -1.36* 
 (-5.36)  (-4.95)  (-2.57) 
Sanctions(t – 1) -.13  -.46*  .16 
 (-.62)  (-2.13)  (.40) 
Independent variable      
Cooperative  .23†  .65***  .14 
 (1.57)  (3.75)  (.60) 
Intercept -6.34***  -7.68***  -4.49** 
 (-5.63)  (-6.18)  (-2.71) 
Year dummies Yes  Yes  Yes 
Location dummies Yes  Yes  Yes 
No. of observations 3829  3829  3829 
Wald χ2 126.04***  138.33***  58.69*** 
χ2 test against pooled 4.57*  2.51†  1.64† 
This table reports the regression results on board deficiency by type of 
violation. In column (1), (2) and (3), we examine whether the board of a 
cooperative bank is more likely to incur sanctions than the board of joint-
stock banks for deficiency in organization and internal control, credit 
management and risk management, respectively. Bank size denotes the 
natural logarithm of total assets. Bank age denotes the natural logarithm of 
the age of a bank. Loans/TA is the ratio of loans on total assets as a proxy 
for the bank business model. NPL/Gross Loans is a measure of bank risk, 
measured as the natural logarithm of non-performing loans on gross loans. 
Abnormal ROE is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the ROE of a bank is 
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higher or lower than the 90th or 10th percentile, respectively. M&A is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank acquires another bank in a given year. 
Listed bank is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank is listed in a stock 
exchange market. C.G. model is a dummy variable equal to 1 for banks 
using a two-tier governance model. Board size is the natural logarithm of 
the number of board members. Gender diversity denotes the proportion of 
female members on the board. Board meetings denotes the natural 
logarithm of the frequency of board meetings. Board turnover denotes the 
natural logarithm of board member turnover. Sanctions(t – 1) is the 
dependent variable lagged one year. Cooperative is a dummy equal to 1 if 
a bank is a cooperative and 0 otherwise. Year and location dummies 
control for year and location fixed effects. Z values are reported in 
parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level.  
† p < .10 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
*** p < .001 
 
TABLE 7 
Regression Results of the Mediation Effect of Board Turnover on the Relationship 
between Cooperative Banks and Board Deficiency 
Dependent variable Board Turnover  Board deficiencies - Prob. (sanction) 
  (1) (2)   (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
        
Control variables        
Bank size (ln) .01*** .002  -.06† .02 -.04 .02 
 (4.70) (.62)  (-1.82) (.46) (-1.33) (.44) 
Bank age (ln) -.01*** -.01**  -.10** -.14*** -.13*** -.17*** 
 (-4.61) (-2.63)  (-2.76) (-3.69) (-3.36) (-4.01) 
Loans/TA -.01 -.003  .48† .50† .57† .58* 
 (-.22) (-.13)  (1.74) (1.80) (1.95) (1.97) 
NPL/Gross loans (ln) .01† .01*  .58*** .56*** .62*** .60*** 
 (1.84) (2.52)  (7.67) (7.35) (7.77) (7.52) 
Abnormal ROE    .45*** .53*** .53*** .59*** 
    (4.35) (5.01) (4.87) (5.33) 
M&A    .332† .31 .39† .36† 
    (1.66) (1.56) (1.85) (1.76) 
Listed banks .03 .02  .61** .71*** .66** .74*** 
 (1.51) (1.11)  (2.99) (3.47) (3.03) (3.40) 
Bank performance(t – 1) (ln) -.16*** -.14**      
 (-3.77) (-3.16)      
C.G. Model .03 .05  .16 .001 .30 .17 
 (.77) (1.61)  (.26) (.00) (.48) (.28) 
Board size (ln)    .35* .27† .34* .27† 
    (2.30) (1.76) (2.11) (1.66) 
Gender diversity    -.02 -.11 .35 .27 
    (-.05) (-.23) (.68) (.53) 
Board meetings (ln)    -.26 -.25 -.26 -.25 
    (-1.38) (-1.30) (-1.30) (-1.25) 
Sanctions(t – 1)    -.30* -.29* -.20 -.21 
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    (-2.05) (-2.00) (-1.32) (-1.36) 
Independent variable        
Cooperative   -.05***   .42***  .35** 
  (-5.48)   (3.30)  (2.62) 
Mediator        
Board turnover (ln)      -1.88*** -1.80*** 
      (-6.22) (-5.96) 
Intercept -.06 .11*  -4.38*** -5.84*** -4.58*** -5.79*** 
 (-1.31) (2.12)  (-5.30) (-6.23) (-5.32) (-5.90) 
Year dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations  3271 3271  3831 3831 3829 3829 
ΔF-value 12.06*** 30***      
Adj. R
2 
.05 .06      
Wald χ2    157.88*** 169.99*** 178.51*** 184.35*** 
χ2 test against pooled 4.57* .00  5.57** 3.37* 7.51** 5.88** 
This table reports the regression results of the mediation effect of board turnover on the relationship between 
cooperative banks and board deficiency. Bank size denotes the natural logarithm of total assets. Bank age 
denotes the natural logarithm of the age of a bank. Loans/TA is the ratio of loans on total assets as a proxy for 
the bank business model. NPL/Gross Loans is a measure of bank risk, measured as the natural logarithm of non-
performing loans on gross loans. Abnormal ROE is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the ROE of a bank is higher 
or lower than the 90th or 10th percentile, respectively. M&A is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank acquires 
another bank in a given year. Listed bank is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank is listed in a stock exchange 
market. C.G. model is a dummy variable equal to 1 for banks using a two-tier governance model. Board size is 
the natural logarithm of the number of board members. Gender diversity denotes the proportion of female 
members on the board. Board meetings denotes the natural logarithm of the frequency of board meetings. Board 
turnover denotes the natural logarithm of board member turnover. Sanctions(t – 1) is the dependent variable 
lagged one year. Cooperative is a dummy equal to 1 if a bank is a cooperative and 0 otherwise. Year and 
location dummies control for year and location fixed effects. Z values are reported in parentheses. Standard 
errors are clustered at the bank level.  
† p < .10 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
*** p < .001 
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 TABLE 8 
Regression Results of Board Deficiency – Pre-Post Design approach.  
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Dependent Variable 
Prob. 
(sanction) 
 
No. of 
infringements 
 
Two-part model: Severity of 
penalty 
Estimation Method Probit model  
Negative 
binomial model 
 
Part I: Binary 
model 
Part II: OLS 
Regression 
 (1)  (2)  (3a) (3b) 
Control variables       
Bank size (ln) .05  .10  .05 .24*** 
 (1.03)  (.99)  (1.03) (3.76) 
Bank age (ln) -.07  -.15  -.07 -.03 
 (-1.45)  (-1.51)  (-1.45) (-.67) 
Loans/TA  .45  1.01  .45 .48 
 (1.11)  (1.25)  (1.11) (1.49) 
NPL/Gross loans (ln) .59***  1.23***  .59*** .22* 
 (6.01)  (6.39)  (6.01) (2.19) 
Abnormal ROE .55***  1.35***  .55*** .28* 
 (3.95)  (5.28)  (3.95) (2.11) 
M&A .40†  1.18*  .40† .35 
 (1.77)  (2.42)  (1.77) (.97) 
Listed bank .87***  1.98***  .87*** .41 
 (3.47)  (4.35)  (3.47) (1.52) 
C.G. model .04  .38  .04 -.35 
 (.04)  (.15)  (.04) (-1.22) 
Board size (ln) .34*  .72†  .34* .73*** 
 (1.73)  (1.75)  (1.73) (3.74) 
Gender diversity -.02  .64  -.02 -.69 
 (-.04)  (.54)  (-.04) (-.98) 
Board meetings (ln) -.18  .032  -.18 .14 
 (-.86)  (.08)  (-.86) (.51) 
Board turnover (ln) -2.00***  -4.46***  -2.00*** .25 
 (-4.71)  (-4.70)  (-4.71) (.63) 
Sanctions(t – 1) .11  .14  .11 .01 
 (.78)  (1.06)  (.78) (.42) 
Crisis  -.52†  -1.68**  -.52† -.46 
 (-1.91)  (-2.88)  (-1.91) (-1.23) 
Independent variable       
Cooperative  .38  .39  .38 4.99† 
 (1.49)  (.71)  (1.49) (1.80) 
Cooperative × Bank size      -.29* 
      (-2.28) 
Cooperative × Crisis  .05  .44  .05 .33 
 (.19)  (.85)  (.19) (.83) 
Intercept -7.02***  -11.77***  -7.02*** 2.31 
 (-6.18)  (-5.14)  (-6.18) (1.02) 
Year dummies Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Location dummies Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
No. of observations 3237  3237  3237 186 
Wald χ2 137.37***  226.3***  159.62***  
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ΔF-value      7.79*** 
Adj. R
2
      .479 
LR test against pooled 1.50  .52    
LR test against a Poisson   242.66***    
This table contains the results of the same models estimated in Table 6; however, in this table, we run a 
pre-post design approach. Bank size denotes the natural logarithm of total assets. Bank age denotes the 
natural logarithm of the age of a bank. Loans/TA is the ratio of loans on total assets as a proxy for the 
bank business model. NPL/Gross Loans is a measure of bank risk, measured as the natural logarithm of 
non-performing loans on gross loans. Abnormal ROE is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the ROE of a 
bank is higher or lower than the 90th or 10th percentile, respectively. M&A is a dummy variable equal to 
1 if a bank acquires another bank in a given year. Listed bank is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank is 
listed in a stock exchange market. C.G. model is a dummy variable equal to 1 for banks using a two-tier 
governance model. Board size is the natural logarithm of the number of board members. Gender diversity 
denotes the proportion of female members on the board. Board meetings denotes the natural logarithm of 
the frequency of board meetings. Board turnover denotes the natural logarithm of board member 
turnover. Sanctions(t – 1) is the dependent variable lagged one year. Crisis is a dummy variable equal to 1 
for years from 2008 to 2012. Cooperative is a dummy equal to 1 if a bank is a cooperative and 0 
otherwise. Cooperative × Bank size is an interaction term between bank institutional setting and bank 
size. Cooperative × Crisis is an interaction term between bank institutional setting and the Crisis dummy. 
Year and location dummies control for year and location fixed effects. Z values are reported in 
parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level.  
† p < .10 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
*** p < .001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
